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Lacan’s Thing With Hegel  
 
Richard Boothby  
        for Todd McGowan, 
        the apostle of contradiction 
 
In the opening of his brilliantly insightful book on Hegel, Todd McGowan makes good 
use of the apochryphal story about Hegel’s last words before dying: “Only one man 
has understood me, and even he did not understand me.”  McGowan rightly 
observes that “no other philosopher in the Western tradition occasions such wild 
divergence concerning the principal concerns of her or his philosophy.”   
 
To capture the immensity of the divergence of views concerning Hegel, one 
would have to imagine some readers of Marx seeing him as a champion of 
the capitalist system rather than its foremost opponent or envision disciples 
positing Friedrich Nietzsche as an advocate of Christian morality rather than its 
fierce critic.1 
 
In view of this history of colossal misreadings, McGowan proposes that a 
prime source of problems for interpreters of Hegel is that he arrived a century too 
early.  Hegel attempted to radically rethink the cardinal problem of contradiction, 
asserting an ontology of subjectivity inescapably rooted in contradiction, one 
hundred years before the breakthrough accomplished by Sigmund Freud.  It was the 
invention of psychoanalysis that revealed unmistakably how the human being is a 
split subject.  For Freud, the pitfalls of self-contradiction are not limited to the 
embarrassing slips of the tongue that bedevil otherwise well-intentioned people – like 
the man in Freud’s famous example who, tripped up by his own mixed emotions, 
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brought down his gavel to open a conference by saying “I hereby declare this 
meeting adjourned!”  On the contrary, contradiction is inscribed into the fundamental 
structure of human subjectivity.  Irremediably divided between conscious intention 
and unconscious desire, the human being is by necessity a creature at odds with 
itself.  
McGowan points out that the contradictory split in the subject “manifests itself 
most concretely in the psychoanalytic symptom,” and he develops that idea with 
reference to Freud’s classical formulation, that of a “compromise formation” that 
serves two masters.  “The symptom is at once the expression of the subject’s desire 
and the indication of that desire’s repression.”2  The symptom simultaneously enacts 
the repression of an unconscious impulse, but it also, at least symbolically, gratifies 
that very impulse.  The Bible-thumping sermon that rages against the evils of the 
flesh pounds home a repressive message, but also inevitably licks its lips with 
enjoyment about the very degeneracy it vilifies. 
In this essay, I want fully to endorse McGowan’s perspective but also to 
supplement it by sketching a radical interpretation of the symptom from a Lacanian 
standpoint that intersects with the philosophy of Hegel.  But Lacan with Hegel?  
Before launching my argument, it has to be acknowledged that Lacan, too, has to be 
grouped with the long list of bad readers of Hegel that McGowan takes to task.  It is 
quite true that Lacan refers a very great deal to Hegel, and that he took key lessons 
from Hegel’s work.  References to Hegel in Lacan’s Écrits massively out-number any 
other thinker with the exception of Freud.  But those citations cluster around two foci, 
one admiring and one resolutely critical. The greater part of the positive take-aways 
are associated with the imaginary drama of recognition and aggressivity, which 
Lacan sees as akin to Hegel’s dialectic of master and slave.  For Lacan, Hegel 
“provided the definitive theory of the specific function of aggressiveness in human 
ontology.”3  On this count, Hegel appears to attract Lacan precisely because he was 
a theorist of constitutive contradictory tension. 
But Lacan also takes Hegel, in accordance with the sadly familiar 
interpretation of Hegel’s “absolute knowing,” to chart a dialectical resolution of 
conflict, a final metaphysical closure.  This move Lacan categorically rejects.  Thus 
Lacan lays it down as “inadmissible that I should be accused of having been lured by 
a purely dialectical exhaustion of being.”4  It is in this second instance that we 
glimpse the sticking point of Lacan’s enduring ambivalence toward the very term 
“dialectic,” and the prime reason he so often distances himself from Hegel even as 
he repeatedly returns to him like the proverbial moth.  
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In what follows, I want to illuminate the deeply Hegelian character of Lacan’s 
theorization of the symptom by putting forward an interpretation that Lacan himself 
never specifically articulated though which is everywhere implied by his thought.  I 
want to show in a novel way how a red thread of Hegelian philosophy can be 
discerned at the very foundations of Lacan’s reappropriation of Freud. 
I take my point of departure from one of the most dramatic moments in 
Lacan’s teaching, the sustained discussion of das Ding that occupies roughly the first 
half of his 7th Seminar, “The Ethics of Psychoanalysis.”  Lacan’s reference is to a brief 
passage from the unpublished “Project for a Scientific Psychology” of 1895, in which 
Freud theorizes that the child divides the figure of the Nebenmensch, the “neighbour” 
or fellow human being, between what it can recognize on the basis of similarities to 
its own body – precisely the sort of reflective recognition that Lacan associates with 
the imaginary – and a locus of something that is “new and non-comparable,” a zone 
of something unknown.5   This excess of something unrepresentable Freud calls das 
Ding, and he goes on to argue that this splitting of the human Other, a division that 
reserves in the heart of the familiar a locus for something unknown, serves as the 
basic schema for all of the child’s future attempts to understand the nature of objects.  
“For this reason,” Freud writes,” it is in relation to the fellow human-being that a 
human-being learns to cognize.”  The key point is not merely that there remains an 
inaccessible, noumenal core of all objects but that the original template that alerts 
the child to the existence of such an unknown dimension is taken from the example 
of what is unfathomable in the fellow human being.6 
It's hard to overstate the emphasis Lacan puts on the problematic of das Ding 
for rewriting the essentials of his entire outlook.7  The Thing becomes nothing less 
than the primordial pivot around which the effects of the unconscious revolve.  “Das 
Ding,” he says, “is a primordial function which is located at the level of the initial 
establishment of the gravitation of the unconscious Vorstellungen.”8  Precisely 
because the Thing occupies the most obscure core of the unconscious, the most 
inaccessible yet determinative engine of desire, it deserves to be identified as the 
most elemental motive cause of human behavior.  As if to emphasize a profundity 
that resonates with the most archaic roots of thought in the ancient world, Lacan 
resorts to a salad of Latin and Greek: “At the heart of man’s destiny is the Ding, the 
causa [. . .]  it is the causa pathomenon, the cause of the most fundamental human 
passion.”9   
If das Ding forms in some way the core of the unconscious, Lacan also 
identifies it with the most elemental functions of speech and language.  “Das Ding,” 
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he says, [. . . ] is the very correlative of the law of speech in its most primitive point of 
origin.”  He insists, in fact, that “the Thing only presents itself to the extent that it 
becomes word.”10 As we will see in what follows, it is the way in which something of 
das Ding is taken up into and sustained by the signifier that allows for the fact, as 
Lacan puts it, that “the question of das Ding is still attached to whatever is open, 
lacking, or gaping at the center of our desire.”11   
What is new and crucially important in Lacan’s treatment of the Thing over that 
of Freud is the way he identifies the enigmatic locus of something uncognized in the 
maternal Other with the root source of anxiety.  This idea forms the core theme of 
Lacan’s tenth seminar on Anxiety.  Lacan expressly rejects Freud’s comparison of 
anxiety as fear without an object.  “Not only is [anxiety] not without object,” says 
Lacan, “but it very likely designates the most, as it were, profound object, the ultimate 
object, the Thing.”12  The challenge of the neighbour-Thing consists not simply in the 
discovery of an inaccessible kernel at the heart of the Other but in the way that it 
raises the unsettling question of what object I am for that unknown desire.  “Anxiety,” 
Lacan insists, “resides in the subject’s fundamental relationship [. . .] with the desire of 
the Other.”13  “Anxiety is bound to the fact that I don’t know which object a I am for the 
desire of the Other.”14 The question presses with particular force in the drama of toilet 
training when the demand of the care-taker for the regulation of the infant’s bowels 
reenergizes anxiety about the unanswered question of what the maternal Other 
wants.  The Lacanian thesis thus goes beyond merely locating the source of anxiety 
in the fellow human being.  It asserts, contrary to the sweetest myth about childhood, 
that the hidden source of the deepest and most uncanny anxiety is the mother 
herself. 
 
What provokes anxiety [ . . . ] is not, contrary to what is said, the rhythm of the 
mother’s alternating presence and absence.  The proof of this is that the infant 
revels in repeating this game of presence and absence. [ . . . ] The most 
anguishing thing for the infant is precisely  [. . . ] when the mother is on his 
back all the while, and especially when she’s wiping his backside.15   
 
The essential point at stake in locating anxiety in the encounter with the fellow 
human being is underlined simply but powerfully, and with an interesting link to 
Hegel, when we attend to the almost inescapably tense situation that arises around 
meeting the eyes of another person. There is virtually no human culture in which this 
highly charged moment is not surrounded by unwritten yet unmistakable 
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prohibitions.  Indeed, it would not be too much to say that eye contact between 
strangers, sustained even momentarily, is a kind of uncodified but absolutely 
elementary human taboo.  In most situations, meeting the gaze of the Other is not to 
be maintained for more than a second or two.  If such a meeting lingers more than 
that, it almost inevitably triggers anxiety.  Otherwise said, eye contact readily raises 
the specter of das Ding.  While Lacan himself doesn’t comment upon it, this 
interpretation returns us to the famous passage from Hegel’s Jena manuscripts in 
which he compares the human subject to an inky Night of fearful apparitions. Hegel’s 
point would seem very precisely to endorse the implication of Lacan’s theory the 
anxiety-producing neighbour-Thing: the eyes of the fellow human being present us 
with a terrifying abyss. 
 
The human being is this Night, this empty nothing which contains everything 
in its simplicity – a wealth of infinitely many representations, images, none of 
which occur to it directly, and none of which are not present. This [is] the 
Night, the interior of [human] nature, existing here – pure Self – [and] in 
phantasmagoric representations it is night everywhere: here a bloody head 
suddenly shoots up and there another white shape, only to disappear as 
suddenly. We see this Night when we look a human being in the eye, looking 
into a Night which turns terrifying.16 
 
The fuller implications of locating the uncanny and abyssal Thing in the child’s 
relation to the mother concern nothing less than Lacan’s rewriting of the Freudian 
Oedipus complex.  The psychic challenge posed by the child’s relation with the 
mother is not, as Freud thought, the pain of having to give up its desire for the 
mother, along with accepting the traumatic consequences that accrue from the 
paternal threat of castration that effects separation.  On the contrary, the challenge is 
posed to the child by the mother’s desire, in so far as it remains an unknown.  The 
figure of the mother rears up as a fearful and monstrous specter, the threatening void 
of a gigantic question mark.  If there is a link to the myth of Oedipus in this Lacanian 
perspective, it resides less in the familiar schema of murdering the father and 
marrying the mother than it does with Oedipus as the man who confronts a mortal 
riddle.  Lacan poses the mother in the role of the dreadful and enigmatic Sphinx.  It is 
in the light of this perspective that we can make sense of Lacan’s unsettling 
comparison of the mother to a giant praying mantis.17 Elsewhere, Lacan invokes a 
similar metaphor, likening the mother to a crocodile and the phallic signifier to a stick 
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with which to keep its jaws from snapping shut.18  Refusing the notion that the child 
forsakes the mother under the father’s threat of castration, Lacan proposes that the 
child takes its own distance from the maternal Thing, a defensive operation made 
possible by reliance on the signifier.  The notion of the Other-Thing, introduced in 
1960, thus becomes retroactively the key to Lacan’s conception of the paternal 
metaphor in which the “Name of the Father” is substituted for the unknown Desire of 
the Mother.19   
 In being confronted by the Thing in the Other, what is ultimately at stake is the 
subject’s own coming-to-be, the subject’s own being-a-Thing-to-itself. The zone of 
the questionable in the Other is also that of the subject’s own question.  The Other’s 
void is the launch-point of the subject’s own desire. The unknown Thing thus 
promises to translate Lacan’s signature thesis that human desire is the desire of the 
Other.  This most elusive stake of the game concerns the real of the subject’s mute 
jouissance.  It is a locus that can be approached only in mythic terms, conceivable 
only as a primordial, indeterminate X.  Lacan’s point is that the void of the Other 
always comes first, and that the question of the subject’s desire can be posed only in 
the locus of the Other. “What anxiety targets in the real,” he concludes, “includes the x 
of a primordial subject moving towards his advent as subject, [. . .] since the subject 
has to realize himself on the path to the Other. [. . . this subject] is the subject of 
jouissance [. . .] it can in no way be isolated as a subject, unless mythically.”20 
It is, however, with respect to Lacan’s conception of the signifier that we can 
mark the most profound linkage with the thought of Hegel.  The key is to recognize 
how the signifier performs a double function of defense and engagement, of 
distancing and reconnecting.   
 The relation of the signifier to the Thing is twofold.  The first “level” is essentially 
defensive.  Thus Lacan says of das Ding that “the magic circle that separates us from 
it is imposed by our relation to the signifier.”21  It is along this line that Lacan analyzes 
the mono-syllabic sounding of the second person pronoun.22  “What does the 
emission, the articulation, the sudden emergence from out of our voice of that “You!” 
(Toi!)  mean?” he asks.  And he answers:  “You” contains a form of defense, and I 
would say that at the moment when it is spoken, it is entirely in this “You,” and 
nowhere else, that one finds what I have evoked today concerning das Ding.”23  
Slavoj Zizek gives a good summary statement of this defensive function of the 
signifier, generalized in the symbolic law that governs it.  “The ultimate function of the 
Law,” he says, “is not to [. . .]  retain our proximity to the neighbor, but, on the contrary, 
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to keep the neighbor at a proper distance, to serve as a kind of protective wall 
against the monstrosity of the neighbour.”24   
Lacan expands on this defensive effect in what he calls primally “ceded 
objects” – les objets cessibles – his update of Freudian part objects, which include 
not only the breast and the feces but also the first inarticulate cries of the infant.  In 
each case, something is given up by the infant, thrust into the space between subject 
and Other as if to establish a zone of separation.25  These intermediary objects are the 
first incarnations of the objet a.  The surprising result is that the most primordial 
function of language in human beings is thereby thought to consist not in connection 
but disjunction, not in communication with others but in separation from them.  The 
first word of the human infant is a declaration of independence.  This reading gives a 
new twist to the Hegelian phrase Lacan liked to quote from early on: “the word is the 
murder of the Thing.”   
Yet if the first inchoate eruptions of the voice, inflected with anxiety, separate 
the subject from Other, they are also destined to become the means by which the 
question of das Ding will be ceaselessly re-posed.  As Lacan says: “The world of our 
experience, the Freudian world, assumes that it is this object, das Ding, as the 
absolute Other of the subject, that one is supposed to find again.”26  On this side of its 
function, the signifier marks the site of the unknown Thing, locating it at a distance 
yet holding and sustaining it in preparation for further exploration.  What is at stake is 
the most radical implication of Lacan’s theory of the signifier, perhaps the very thing 
that led him to claim that he had “defined the signifier as no one else had dared.” 27  In 
every entry into language, in every iteration of signifying material, there resounds 
some echo of the unanswered and unanswerable question of the Thing.  Here, 
Lacan’s conception of the signifier departs from the dominant assumption among 
students of language that the primal function of signification is indicative.  At the 
most elementary level, the first utterance, indeed every utterance, implicitly poses a 
question. The original function of language is not merely indicative, but interrogative. 
 In exactly what way, then, does the signifier overcome its fundamentally 
defensive function in order to re-access the Thing?  How, as Lacan put it early in his 
career, is the signifier able “to recover the debt that it engenders”?28  The answer is 
less a matter of the way Lacan inverts Saussure’s famous diagram of signifier, 
signaling the primacy of the signifier over the signified, than of the stress Lacan puts 
on the bar that separates the two. For Lacan, the vector of meaning that connects 
signifier to signified is paradoxically less important than the resistance to that 
connection, the incompleteness or failure of that vector. The most fertile dimension of 
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the signifier consists in the way that it opens a horizon of semantic indeterminacy.  
The “resistance” of the bar between signifier and signified has the effect of holding 
open the possibility of “something more” than the ostensible meaning.  For Lacan, 
such pregnant “resistance” arises from Saussure’s own signature contribution to 
linguistics, namely that the meaning of each signifier is dependent on its relations 
within the diacritical system of its relations with other signifiers.  It is the effect of this 
interweaving, the “pull” on every signifier exerted by the larger network in which it is 
embedded, that constitutes the so-called “resistance” of the bar.  By means of the 
interwovenness of the system, Lacan claims, “the signifier reflects its light into the 
darkness of incomplete significations.”  The signifier’s most important function 
resides in energizing a penumbra of incomplete tendrils of meaning, including even 
subtler reverberations that border on pure nonsense.  
 In Lacan’s view, the “resistance” of the bar is what makes possible the 
metaphoric conjunction between two distinctly different terms.  It provides the wiggle 
room for the poetic spark, or the neurotic slip.  But there is also a more radical 
dimension at stake that is relevant to the void of the Thing. We can glimpse it in one 
of Lacan’s earliest and most well-known discussions of metaphor, focused on the 
example he takes from Victor Hugo’s “Booz endormi”: “His sheaf was neither miserly 
nor spiteful.”  The ostensible purpose of the metaphor, what is obliquely being said 
about Booz, concerns his generosity. His sheaves, “neither miserly nor spiteful,” might 
be shared out with those in need. Yet just as the very binding-together into sheaves 
relies for its meaning on its implicit negation in spilling or scattering, the metaphor 
that speaks for Booz’ magnanimity also subtly hints at its very opposite. Booz is 
thereby linked to the very greed and spitefulness that the metaphor would seem to 
deny.  As Lacan says, when the metaphoric sheaf stands in for Booz himself,  
 
it has replaced him in the signifying chain at the very place where he was to 
be exalted by the sweeping away of greed and spite.  But now Booz himself 
has been swept away by the sheaf, and hurled into the outer darkness where 
greed and spite harbor him in the hollow of their negation.29  
 
Every enunciation of the signifier, as if inevitably casting a kind of negative 
shadow of the very thing it signifies, tacitly calls up its very opposite.  But with this 
focus on the diacritical system of the signifier, haven’t we strayed far beyond the 
“perceptual complex” that Freud associated with das Ding, the opposition between 
the contour of the object and the registration of an uncognizable excess?   Not at all.  
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To see how and why affords us a profound insight into the nature and structure of 
the signifier at the most fundamental level.  It is quite true that the archaic drama of 
the Komplex der Nebenmensch envisioned by Freud occurs before the infant’s 
mastery of speech.  But this fact does not at all rule out the elemental functioning of 
signification.  On the contrary, the imaginary-real binary of the “perceptual complex” 
of das Ding is itself identical with the most basic structure of every signifier.   
To grasp this point, consider the following.  When does a pointing finger 
become a signifier?  Precisely when one sees the finger, but then looks away from it 
in the direction towards which it points.  This deceptively simple operation requires 
two indispensable acts on the part of the perceiver. The first, of course, is the 
perceptual recognition of the finger itself as a discrete object of attention. This first 
step of the act of ostension can easily be achieved by your dog.  But the second 
crucial stage the dog cannot follow.  For the finger to succeed in functioning as a 
signifier, it is necessary that the finger-image be immediately taken as merely the 
jumping-off spot for something else at some distance away. The image of the finger 
must be psychically evacuated of attention in favor of something completely different 
that hasn’t yet appeared in the visual field, something as yet unknown. This transfer is 
what the dog can’t manage.  What the dog lacks is a capacity for the negative, for an 
empty expectation, an anticipation of one-knows-not-what. The pointing finger casts 
our attention outward in readiness to be surprised.30  As Heidegger would have put it, 
the meaning of the pointing finger is to direct us toward some remote site of die 
Lichtung, the pure opening of disclosure.   
The underlying dynamic at stake here is by no means limited to ostension.  
Every letter, every word, spoken or written, must first somehow minimally register 
upon perception.  The signifier is, as Saussure reminded us, first of all an image.  But 
image-recognition of the signifier is converted to signification only when the bare 
image-body of the signifier is instantaneously passed over in favor of something 
other than itself––the signified.  The purpose of the signifying image is to self-vacate 
its own claim on attention, abdicating its own status as image, and thereby making 
itself transparent to its meaning.  Crucially for Lacan’s theory of the signifier, however, 
that’s not all.  The movement of the signifier toward meaning also opens up an 
indeterminant dimension, a kind of ontological wiggle-room in the zone of the 
signified, that leaves an open space in which it is possible, among other things, for 
the receiver of the message to ask whether the message was heard correctly, to 
wonder if something else was intended by it, or to fear that the speaker was lying.  
However distantly, the signifier always bears within itself an echo of the unknown 
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Thing.  In this way, far from wholly lacking the dimension of the symbolic, Freud’s 
Komplex der Nebenmensch can be identified with the absolutely original instance of 
the signifier.  It schematizes the zero-degree of signification.  
The double action of the signifier, simultaneously defensive and expressive, 
distancing and disclosive, is precisely parallel to Freudian theory of the compromise 
formation of the symptom.  Indeed, we can now wonder whether this conjunction of 
the Lacanian signifier with the Freudian symptom isn’t the most fundamental and far-
reaching feature of Lacan’s rewriting of psychoanalytic theory. Its implication is that 
the paradox of symptomatic behavior is not confined to exceptional moments in 
which human nature is bent under the pressure of contingency.  Human behaviour is 
symptomatic through and through.  In the human psyche, it’s symptoms “all the way 
down.”31  
If the two-fold function of the signifier embodies the Freudian symptom, it also 
constitutes an exemplary instance, perhaps the exemplary instance, of Hegelian 
Aufhebung, the very heartbeat of the dialectical movement that Hegel is everywhere 
at pains to illustrate.  In accord with the two-fold meaning of the German word, 
something that undergoes Aufhebung is simultaneously canceled and preserved. In 
the famous dialectical movement with which Hegel opens his Logic, for example, the 
concept of Being finds its Aufhebung in Becoming.  In the stream of Becoming, the 
ever-flowing river of Heraclitus, the unchanging stillness of Being is annulled, 
replaced by ceaseless motion and flux.  And yet the stillness of Being also returns in 
a new form.  In the river of becoming, the one thing that remains the same, 
unchanging, is change itself.   
In exactly such a dialectical movement, we can now say that the linguistic 
signifier, at the most elementary level of its functioning, serves to accomplish the 
most primordial Aufhebung.  The signifier both cancels das Ding, distancing the 
subject from it, offering an arbitrary sound in the place of the unknown Thing, yet it 
also preserves something of what is canceled, marking it for further cognizing 
sometime in the future. The signifier establishes a locus suspended between the 
subject and the Other, at once putting what remains unknown and potentially 
threatening about the Other at a safe distance, yet thereby repositions it and 
maintains it as a question.32  The deepest parallel to Hegel centers on the way that 
Aufhebung can be said to be the process by which the determination of any 
particular thing is made possible by a dialectically oppositional relation with what it is 
not.  As Hegel says in a willing bow to Spinoza, “Determination is negation.” If the first 
movement of Aufhebung effects a negation, the second enables, by a negation of the 
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negation, a reapproach by a new path to what has been negated.  Only such a 
double movement unleashes what Hegel called “the portentous power of the 
negative.”  Lacan claims something similar for the reality of discourse mediated by 
the signifier.  The result is that discourse is never, nor ever can be, fully transparent.  It 
always regenerates a dimension of the questionable. “Every discourse presents itself 
as heavy with consequences,” Lacan says, “but ones that are obscure.  Nothing of 
what we say, in principle, fails to imply some.  Nevertheless we do not know which.”33  
In the terms we have been working out here, discourse never fails to bear within 
itself, and to reproduce in its consequences for the unfolding of thought, something 
of the dimension of das Ding. 
What is emerging from this discussion is what we might call the “elementary 
matrix of the signifier.”34 The structure of that matrix arises from the way in which the 
primordial word is spoken to the Other, which means it is centered on the relation to 
das Ding. And the elementary matrix has a conspicuously two-fold function.  It is at 
once separating and signifying.  The “ceded object” of the signifier introduces a 
distance between the subject and the Other but it also designates the Other and 
thereby opens the space of the question about what remains unknown about the 
Other.  In his 20th seminar, Lacan calls this tropism toward a vacant potentiality of 
meaning “signifiance.”35  As opposed to “signification,” which indicates the more 
specific semantic cargo of the signifier, “signifiance” names power of the signifier to 
hold open a horizon of meaning-as-yet-to-be-determined.  This horizon is 
inseparable from the Other to whom the signifier is addressed and from whom a 
response is expected.  Moreover, this inseparability from the Other is arguably the 
very flip side of the initial moment of separation.  The conception at which we arrive 
is therefore one of a two-fold function. The signifier both separates from the Other 
and, in the very same stroke, rebinds the subject to the Other.  How are we to clarify 
this double-function? 
The matrix of the signifier presents two potentialities.  On one side, we have 
the attachment of the signifier to a particular signified. Call it the signifier’s primary 
semantic force.  It grounds a stable meaning.  We hear a word and are bound to 
imagine the object or state of affairs that it signifies.  Lacan more than once points 
out that where Saussure called the linkage between signifier and signified “arbitrary,” 
intending to point to the absence of any natural connection between them, he 
(Lacan) stresses the necessary connection.  When we hear the word 
“hippopotamus,” it is virtually impossible to avoid thinking of a hippopotamus.  But 
there is a second, essentially elusive dimension of every signifier that opens out 
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toward an indeterminate horizon.  It is this second dimension that is tied to das Ding 
and its status as an unknown.  It’s tempting, in contrast with the determinate 
meaning of the semantic, to call this other dimension simply mantic.  In fact, what is 
at stake is well reflected in the sense of the Greek word mantikos, which referred to 
prophecy and divination.  What is mantic reaches out into something beyond our 
ken.  Intimately related to mantikos is the word mania, which in Greek implies a kind 
of inspired madness.  In its mantic dimension, the spoken word always reaches 
beyond a definite assignment of meaning toward an ecstatic horizon of 
indeterminacy, a meaning-as-yet-unknown. 
We can relate this two-fold dimensionality of the signifier--semantic vs. mantic-
-to the common distinction between denotation and connotation, and for good 
reason. Denotation generally involves a direct reference to some definite object or 
state of affairs where connotation may spread out in various directions in what might 
be thought of as incomplete tendrils of meaning, mere hints or shades of meaning.  
We can also readily relate the vaguer but potentially more fertile and far-reaching 
connotative dimension to the way in which every signifier is bound up with the larger 
system of other signifiers.  In this sense, the elusive dimension is to be related to the 
allusive.  There’s no doubt that Lacan is intensely interested in such an allusive 
penumbra of meaning, particularly in his analyses of metaphor and metonymy. But 
there is clearly, and very crucially, something more radical at stake in the Lacanian 
conception of the signifier.  We touched on it earlier in discussing Lacan’s notion of 
the bar that separates signifier and signified.  Lacan posits a kind of positive 
resistance to definite signification.  The result is the symbolic projection of a gap or 
void. As he puts it, “the fashioning of the signifier and the introduction of a gap or a 
hole in the real is identical.”36  For Lacan, there is an excess of all semantic import that 
is potentially borne by every signifier and that passes beyond even the most vaguely 
connotative resonance of meaning.  One is tempted to make a reference, as Lacan 
himself does more than once, to the pre-Socratic notion of Non-being. Every signifier 
bears within itself an appeal to pure lack, to a Thing which is a No-thing. 
Is not some such open space of pure anticipation of meaning a positive 
condition for the formation of metaphor, the very thing that makes metaphor 
possible? The question concerns the open zone of potential association, across 
which the poetic spark jumps. In order for a metaphor to work – using, to cite a 
classic example, the metaphor of “the flower of the nation” to refer to young men 
drafted for war – one must be able to hear and understand the semantic content of 
the word “flower” while holding open a space of meaning yet-to-be-determined that 
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lies in some way beyond the conventional denotation of the petal-blossom that 
enables botanical reproduction.  This open space is precisely the continuing 
resonance of the lack in the Other that Lacan calls das Ding. 
A final piece of confirmation of the Lacanian thesis about the open horizon of 
the signifier, the dimension that he variously calls manque à être or béance, is 
offered in precisely the place we would most want and need to find it: at the heart of 
the psychoanalytic process itself.  For how else are we to account for the 
phenomenon of free association?  In free association, I give myself over to a pure 
openness (a task well known to be trickier one might think) toward connections to 
apparently unrelated ideas.  A subjective posturing toward an unfettered readiness to 
receive whatever comes to mind is both the heart of the psychoanalytic method, the 
means by which dreams, slips, and fantasies will be opened toward a larger horizon 
of connections to other things, but is also a key goal to be achieved by analysis.  To 
have passed through a successful psychoanalysis is to feel oneself more readily 
called by what doesn’t make sense from the standpoint of conscious calculation.  
The “well analyzed” person has, among other things, become more open to the 
fertile, even radically transformative influence of thoughts that hover on the border of 
complete nonsense.  One way to characterize the positive outcome of analysis is an 
enlarged capacity to tolerate proximity to the unknowable Thing.   
From this angle of view, we glimpse a profound affinity between the goals of 
psychoanalysis and the true meaning of Hegel’s appeal to Absolute Wissen.  The 
ultimate point of the final section of the Phenomenology of Spirit, far from claiming to 
have completed the project of knowing, to have grasped some all-embracing, all-
integrating vision of Truth at the end of history, is rather an assertion of a renewed 
and reverential appreciation of unknowing, the way in which the subject comes to 
realize that there can be no complete knowledge.  The paradoxical lesson of 
Absolute Knowing leads finally to releasing oneself to the enigma of the object, to re-
engaging the experience of reality in its ultimate unknowability.  As Slavoj Žižek 
summarizes this point, the subject of Absolute Knowing becomes  “a thoroughly 
emptied subject, a subject reduced to the role of pure observer (or, rather, registrator) 
of the self-movement of the content itself.”37  This moment of release is the 
culmination of Spirit’s life-process, in which Spirit gives itself to the very otherness of 
the object.  “The supreme moment of the subject’s freedom,” Žižek says, “is when it 
sets free its object, leaving it alone to freely deploy itself [ . . . ]  ‘Absolute freedom’ is 
here literally absolute in the etymological meaning of absolvere: releasing, letting 
go. . . Is this not the Hegelian version of Gelassenheit?”38  Mindful of this perspective, 
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the climactic sentences of Hegel’s conclusion on “Absolute Knowing” ring in our ears 
with a completely refreshed significance. 
 
The self-knowing spirit knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or its 
limit: to know one’s limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself.  This sacrifice is 
the externalization in which Spirit displays the process of its becoming Spirit in 
the form of free contingent happening, intuiting its pure Self as Time outside of 
it, and equally its Being as Space.  This last becoming of Spirit, Nature, is its 
living immediate Becoming; Nature, the externalized Spirit, is in its existence 
nothing but this eternal externalization of its continuing existence and the 
movement which reinstates the Subject.39 
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